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Mandatory information disclosure regulations seek to create institutional pressure to spur 
performance improvement. By examining how organizational characteristics moderate 
establishments’ responses to a prominent environmental information disclosure program, we 
provide among the first empirical evidence characterizing heterogeneous responses by those 
mandated to disclose information. We find particularly rapid improvement among establishments 
located close to their headquarters and among establishments with proximate siblings, especially 
when the proximate siblings are in the same industry. Large establishments improve more slowly 
than small establishments in sparse regions, but both groups improve similarly in dense regions, 
suggesting that density mitigates the power of large establishments to resist institutional pressures. 
Finally, privately held firms’ establishments outperform those owned by public firms. We 
highlight implications for institutional theory, managers, and policymakers.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Organizations respond to pressures from a variety of constituencies and stakeholders. Community 
members, consumers, investors, and activist groups can exert pressure on firms to curb undesired 
behaviors.  In some cases, mandatory disclosure programs, a market-based form of regulation, provide 
information that fuels such pressure. Recent years have seen a significant increase in the use of 
information disclosure as a regulatory mechanism; for example, forcing manufacturers to reveal details of 
the pollution they generate, food producers to include nutritional information on product labels, and 
restaurants to post kitchen hygiene ratings.  2 
 
Most research examining the effectiveness of information disclosure has focused on aspects of 
disclosure programs that influence their success (Weil et al., 2006; Fung et al., 2007), and either average 
effects on how effects vary based on firms’ external environment (Delmas and Toffel, 2012). We theorize 
that characteristics of establishments and their broader organizations, as well as how these interact with 
their institutional environment, influence how establishments react to information disclosure 
requirements.
1 In doing so, we extend both the literature that evaluates the effectiveness of information 
disclosure programs (e.g., Fung, Graham, and Weil, 2007; Jin and Leslie, 2009) and institutional theory 
research that examines heterogeneous responses to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991; Delmas and 
Toffel, 2008). 
We hypothesize that greater improvement will be seen in establishments subject to greater 
internal and external pressure to improve and in those with greater access to the necessary capabilities. 
We test our hypotheses using data from one of the most famous instances of information disclosure 
regulation, the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), often credited with eliciting significant improvements in 
environmental performance (Hart, 2010). We examine how thousands of establishments have responded 
to this regulatory requirement to publicly disclose emissions of hundreds of toxic chemicals and we 
exploit an exogenous shock that occurred when the list of reportable chemicals was expanded. Our 
research is especially important given the prominence of the TRI program, the largely untested faith in the 
power of disclosure and transparency to alter firm behavior, and the societal benefits associated with 
improved environmental performance. 
Our examination of the differential environmental performance improvement of establishments is 
based on five organizational moderators: size; proximity to headquarters; proximity to corporate siblings; 
industry overlap among proximate siblings; and ownership structure (i.e., whether the parent firm is 
publicly traded or privately held). Using emissions reductions as our performance indicator, we find that 
                                                      
1 Information disclosure programs often target single units of a firm, such as individual restaurants or production 
facilities. In this paper, we use the terms ‘establishment’ and ‘facility’ to refer to these units and use ‘firm’ or 
‘organization’ to refer to the larger entity to which such establishments belong.   3 
 
establishments close to their headquarters outperform those with headquarters farther away. We also find 
that establishments with proximate siblings outperform those with siblings that are not proximate and that 
those with proximate siblings in the same industry are especially likely to improve.  Large establishments 
improve more slowly than small establishments in sparse regions, but both groups improve similarly in 
dense regions, suggesting that density mitigates the power of large establishments to resist institutional 
pressures. Finally, establishments owned by privately held firms outperform those owned by publicly 
traded firms. 
RELATED LITERATURE 
Our research relates to two streams of literature: studies that examine how organizations and their 
stakeholders respond to mandatory information disclosure policies, and neo-institutional research that 
explores how newly disclosed information becomes a form of institutional pressure to which 
organizations are expected to respond. 
Responses to information disclosure 
Mandatory information disclosure policies are premised on the notion that requiring an organization to 
reveal information will induce stakeholder pressure that will prompt the organization to improve along the 
disclosed dimension (Greenstone, Oyer, and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2006; Weil et al., 2006). Much of the 
literature examining the effects of information disclosure has focused on how stakeholders such as 
journalists, investors, customers, and regulators respond to information disclosed about an organization. 
For example, information disclosed about organizations’ pollution levels has stimulated media coverage 
and depressed market valuations both of the organizations (Hamilton, 1995) and of neighboring homes 
(Oberholzer-Gee and Mitsunari, 2006). Mandatory disclosure of nutrition information has led customers 
to reduce caloric consumption, especially in areas populated by wealthier, more highly educated 
consumers (Bollinger, Leslie, and Sorensen, 2011).  4 
 
More closely related to our research are studies that investigated how organizations respond to 
information disclosed about them. Several studies have concluded that government programs requiring 
information disclosure have spurred companies to improve their environmental performance (Blackman, 
Afsah, and Ratunanda, 2004; Konar and Cohen, 1997; Scorse, 2010), food and water safety (Bennear and 
Olmstead, 2008; Jin and Leslie, 2003), and surgical outcomes (Cutler, Huckman, and Landrum, 2004; 
Hannan  et al., 1994; Peterson et al., 1998). Some have found that performance improvement was 
especially pronounced among organizations whose initial disclosure performance was below average in 
environmental performance (Blackman et al., 2004; Chatterji and Toffel, 2010; Scorse, 2010), restaurant 
hygiene (Jin and Leslie, 2009), and graduate school ranking (Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Espeland and 
Sauder, 2007).  
Institutional theory 
Institutional theory provides a basis for studying how external pressures affect organizational behavior. In 
this context, mandatory information disclosure programs provide material with which stakeholders can 
pressure firms to improve along the metrics of the information disclosed.  Our work relates to studies of 
firms’ reactions to institutional pressures exerted by regulators (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996; Khanna 
and Anton, 2002; Reid and Toffel, 2009), local communities (Florida and Davison, 2001; Henriques and 
Sadorsky, 1996), customers (Delmas and Montiel, 2008), competitors (Darnall, 2009), and shareholders 
(Reid and Toffel, 2009). But whereas these studies tend to focus on average organizational responses, our 
work examines heterogeneous responses and seeks to respond to a ‘lack of understanding of the 
conditions under which institutional pressures and organizational characteristics explain the adoption of 
beyond compliance strategies’ (Delmas and Toffel, 2012: 231). Recent studies have found evidence that 
an organization’s responses to institutional pressures are moderated by its structure (Delmas and Toffel, 
2008; Okhmatovskiy and David, 2011), location (Lounsbury, 2007), and the marginal cost and perceived 
benefits of responding (Chatterji and Toffel, 2010). By theorizing and empirically testing hypotheses that 5 
 
certain organizational characteristics moderate how organizations respond to institutional pressure, we 
contribute to the nascent literature that examines heterogeneous responses to institutional pressures.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Information disclosure, pressure, and performance 
For firms, as for individuals, the effectiveness of information disclosure in changing their behavior hinges 
on the perceived costs and benefits of the changes (Chatterji and Toffel, 2010; Fung et al., 2007; Jin and 
Leslie, 2009). Chatterji and Toffel (2010) find that, among firms receiving poor environmental ratings, 
those in environmentally sensitive industries are especially likely to improve performance, given their 
heightened scrutiny and potential to be inspected. This scrutiny is the lever that disclosure programs 
utilize in order to ‘reduce specific risks or performance problems’ (Fung et al., 2007: 5). That is, 
information disclosure, whether mandated by government or promulgated by private parties such as 
ratings agencies, is intended to shine a light on previously hidden dimensions of performance with the 
intention of spurring improvement. 
We suggest that information disclosure is more likely to lead to improved performance among 
establishments that attract particularly salient pressures from internal or external stakeholders and that 
have preferential access to intra-organizational expertise. That is, we argue that particular characteristics 
of an establishment and its relationship with the rest of its firm affect its performance following 
information disclosure.  
The role of internal pressure and ease of capability transfer in performance improvement  
Information that reveals poor performance can harm an establishment’s reputation, as has been shown for 
firms (Chatterji and Toffel, 2010), restaurants (Jin and Leslie, 2009), educational institutions (Elsbach and 
Kramer, 1996; Espeland and Sauder, 2007), and factories (King and Lenox, 2002). Such information can 
also impugn the establishment’s parent organization and sibling establishments. Poor performance 
revealed by information disclosure requirements can harm organizations’ reputations and stock prices 6 
 
(Hamilton, 1995; Konar and Cohen, 1997) and can therefore prompt investment in improved procedures 
(including staff training and internal monitoring) and capital equipment aimed at improving performance 
(Chatterji and Toffel, 2010). We consider how disclosure of an establishment’s performance is especially 
likely to spur improvement when the establishment is more firmly embedded in its community due to the 
nearness of its firm’s headquarters or of a sibling establishment.  
Local embeddedness 
Because firms tend to be particularly embedded in the communities in which they are headquartered 
(Marquis and Battilana, 2009), a firm’s headquarters and its nearby affiliated establishments are 
especially motivated to preserve their relationships with their community. Accordingly, research has 
found that establishments near headquarters are less likely to lay off workers (Greenwood et al., 2010) 
and more likely to source from local firms (Audia and Rider, 2010). We argue, therefore, that 
establishments located in their headquarters’ communities will be particularly responsive to stakeholder 
pressures. Proximity to headquarters also magnifies internal pressure on establishments revealed to be 
performing poorly; the disclosed information is particularly visible and salient to top management, which 
has both the incentive and the authority to press for improved performance. Proximity also helps 
headquarters to both monitor and assist such establishments. To summarize, proximity to headquarters is 
likely to magnify pressure from external and internal stakeholders following information disclosure, 
which in turn increases the intensity of the establishment’s response, yielding a superior performance 
trend on the disclosed metric.  




Proximity to sibling establishments  
Proximity to other establishments owned by the same parent can also lead poorly performing 
establishments to improve more quickly, due to embeddedness, reputational spillovers, and capability 
transfers. We elaborate on these mechanisms below.   7 
 
Establishments with proximate siblings, like those with proximate headquarters, are more 
embedded in their community than a single establishment would be. Collectively, the siblings employ 
more people and more community members live near their plants and thus have a personal interest in the 
establishments’ performance.  Information about one establishment, whether positive or negative, can 
affect the reputation of its siblings (Carney and Gedajlovic, 1991), especially those in the same area (Jin 
and Leslie, 2009).  Managers of establishments with proximate siblings will therefore be particularly 
responsive to stakeholder pressures and poorly performing establishments with proximate siblings can 
experience strong internal pressure to improve.  
Proximity to a sibling can also facilitate the transfer of capabilities needed to improve 
performance. While proximity does not guarantee such a transfer, it does create a greater opportunity 
when the ability and willingness to transfer knowledge are there (Argote, McEvily, and Reagans, 2003).  
Geographical proximity can enhance social relationships (Boschma, 2005), which promotes knowledge 
sharing (Szulanski, 1996). Conversely, the face-to-face communication that facilitates knowledge transfer 
(Darr, Argote, and Epple, 1995) becomes more costly and difficult with distance (Lafontaine and Slade, 
2007; Berchicci, Dowell, and King, 2011). 




Proximity enhances the potential for capability transfer, but does not guarantee it.  While prior studies 
have demonstrated that knowledge can be transferred more easily within a firm than across firms (Darr, 
Argote, and Epple, 1995), there remain significant barriers even to transfers within a firm (Szulanski, 
1996).  In particular, transferring capabilities and knowledge between establishments is more difficult 
when the establishments have different operating procedures (Maritan and Brush, 2003; Szulanski, 1996). 
We therefore suggest that capability transfers among proximate siblings are particularly likely to lead to 
improvement in disclosed performance when those establishments are in the same industry and thus more 
likely to have similar production processes and to have common suppliers and customer demands 8 
 
(Capron, Mitchell, and Swaminathan, 2001). This increases both the relevance of the knowledge one 
sibling establishment has to offer and the ability of the other sibling to absorb that knowledge.  
Information disclosure can create the impetus for capability transfer. Even when there is a 
proximate sibling in the same industry, significant barriers to transferring capabilities often result in 
persistent performance differences between the establishments (Chew, Bresnahan, and Clark, 1990; 
O’Dell and Grayson, 1998; Szulanski, 1996). In normal operating conditions, these barriers can impede 
the transfer of capabilities to where they are needed most (Berchicci et al., 2011). Disclosure of an 
establishment’s poor performance, however, may increase the incentives to overcome the barriers and 
transfer the capabilities. Thus, to the extent that intra-organizational capability transfers are activated 
following disclosure, greater performance improvement will be observed among establishments that have 
a proximate sibling in the same industry. 
H3: Following mandatory information disclosure, establishments proximate to same‐industry 
corporate  siblings  will  improve  relative  to  establishments  proximate  to  different‐industry 
corporate siblings.  
 
The role of external pressure in performance improvement 
Organizational characteristics can also affect the salience of external pressures. We hypothesize that size 
and ownership structure will moderate the responses of establishments that face common pressures 
stemming from information disclosure. Below, we theorize that an establishment’s relative size within its 
region affects the pressure put on it and thus its response. We further propose that establishments owned 
by publicly traded firms face different pressures than establishments owned by private firms face, which 
lead to different responses. For each of these organizational characteristics, we offer competing theories 
that predict opposing moderating effects. 
Establishment size and regional density 
Although theory suggests that size is likely to moderate an establishment’s sensitivity to external 
pressures, whether it promotes or inhibits such sensitivity remains ambiguous. Some institutional 
theorists, for example, have argued that larger establishments’ greater visibility makes them especially 9 
 
anxious to maintain legitimacy (Goodstein, 1994; Ingram and Simons, 1995). Their greater visibility in 
their communities also makes them more likely to attract media attention (Ingram and Simons, 1995) and 
to be held to higher standards than smaller establishments (Goodstein, 1994). This suggests that larger 
establishments would be particularly sensitive to external pressures occasioned by disclosure.  
Larger establishments may, conversely, be less sensitive to local pressure generated by 
disclosure. Larger establishments can accrue power through superior political access and can more easily 
afford to lobby or donate to politicians and to sue regulatory agencies (Drope and Hansen, 2006; Hansen, 
Mitchell, and Drope, 2005; Schuler, 1996).  Thus, though they cannot avoid the information disclosure 
requirements, larger establishments may be able to insulate themselves from the resulting pressures.   
Greater political and social capital may also accrue to larger establishments because they provide greater 
employment opportunities. In addition, larger firms may make greater investments in resources that 
insulate them from competition and therefore be less likely to invest in performance improvements 
(Madsen and Walker, 2007). To the extent that larger establishments are more powerful and thus less 
sensitive to local pressure groups, they should be expected to be better able to resist external pressures 
and to show less improvement in the wake of disclosure (Grant, Bergesen, and Jones, 2002). 
We propose that these competing predictions can be reconciled by considering the influence of an 
establishment’s economic, social, and political power in the region from which the pressure emanates. A 
large number of establishments in a given area dilutes any given establishment’s potential power there, 
rendering it more vulnerable to pressure exerted by local regulators and concerned groups. For example, a 
1,000-employee establishment that accounts for only a tiny fraction of a region’s economic activity has 
less power than an establishment of similar size that accounts for a large proportion of the region’s 
economic activity. A large establishment in a sparse region will likely be far better able to leverage its 
contributions to community tax revenues and employment (e.g., Boal and Ransom, 1997), its membership 
in the local elite, and its influence with local regulators (Marquis and Battalina, 2009).  
These arguments suggest the following mechanism by which the number of other establishments 
in a region moderates the effect of establishment size on performance improvement following information 10 
 
disclosure. As implied above, we refer to regions with many establishments as ‘dense’ and regions with 
few establishments as sparse.
2 We expect the relative improvement of large establishments over small 
establishments to be greater in dense regions (where their power to resist community pressures is 
attenuated) than in sparse regions (where their political power is stronger).
3 Put another way: Size 
matters, but even more so the sparser the region. 
H4: Following mandatory information disclosure, regional density moderates the relationship 






Following disclosure, there are several reasons why performance improvement can be expected to be 
greater among establishments owned by publicly traded firms than among establishments owned by 
privately held firms. First, publicly traded firms are accustomed to reporting a wide range of information 
about their operations and are accountable to a greater number of audiences (Fischer and Pollock, 2004; 
Mascarenhas, 1989).  This increased degree of transparency and accountability may make the public firms 
particularly sensitive to the effects of additional information disclosure.  Second, publicly traded firms are 
vulnerable to investors who seek to influence management decisions through publicity-generating 
shareholder resolutions and other mechanisms, whereas private firms seldom encounter activist investors 
(David, Bloom, and Hillman, 2007; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Reid and Toffel, 2009). Third, disclosed 
information can affect the stock price of publicly traded firms (Konar and Cohen, 1997), which can lead 
corporate managers to increase pressure on subsidiary establishments to improve performance.  
H5a: Following mandatory information disclosure, establishments owned by publicly traded 
firms will improve relative to those owned by privately held firms. 
                                                      
2 In our empirical analysis, we measure dense and sparse regions based on establishment count per city. We also 
conduct robustness tests in which we broaden the geographic domain to the county level and others in which we 
define dense and sparse in terms of employment rather than establishment count.  
3 Foreshadowing our empirical approach, we analyze each of these two difference-in-differences, which compare 
performance trends of large establishments to small establishments in sparse regions and separately in dense regions, 




Conversely, since it is often the case that shareholders in public firms are principally concerned 
with share price, those firms may be less sensitive than private firms to mandatory disclosure of 
performance information. Operational improvements (e.g., capital equipment, development of new 
capabilities) often require significant investments that have long payback periods and may not be 
profitable even in the long run (Christmann, 2000; King and Lenox, 2002). We expect publicly traded 
firms under pressure to maintain short-term profits and stock prices to be less likely to make investments 
in operational performance improvements when the financial returns are unclear or occur only over long 
time horizons (Fischer and Pollock, 2004). Private owners, on the other hand, can emphasize nonfinancial 
objectives.  To the extent that these owners identify strongly with their firms, they may be more sensitive 
to institutional pressures such as those that follow from information disclosure (Berrone et al., 2010).  
Private firm owners are likely to have significant portions of their own wealth concentrated in their firms 
(Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002), which also increases the likelihood that they will make long-




DATA AND MEASURES 
Empirical context and sample 
We empirically test our hypotheses by taking advantage of a policy change that occurred when the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) expanded the scope of the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). The 
U.S. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 created the TRI, which requires 
establishments to report—publicly and annually—waste, transfers, and releases of certain toxic 
chemicals. An establishment is required to report if it (1) operates within particular industry sectors, 
including manufacturing, mining, electric utilities, hazardous waste treatment, and chemical distribution, 
(2) employs ten or more people, and (3) manufactures, imports, processes, or otherwise uses any of the 12 
 
listed toxic chemicals in amounts that exceed reporting thresholds (U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2004). TRI-reporting establishments must provide their location, industry classification, and 
parent company as well as data about each qualifying chemical, including the pounds of each that were 
emitted to air, water, land, and underground injection; processed through on-site waste treatment; and 
transferred offsite for treatment or recycling  (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2011). This 
information is available to the public on the EPA’s website (www.epa.gov/tri). 
Since the TRI became operational in 1987, the EPA has periodically expanded the list of 
chemicals to be reported. We leverage this fact in our identification strategy, as described below. As of 
2011, the EPA required disclosure of 593 individual chemicals in 30 chemical categories (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2011). To construct our database, we supplement establishments’ 
annual TRI reports with Dun and Bradstreet data obtained from the National Establishment Time-Series 
(NETS) database, as described below. Our resulting panel dataset consists of 38,175 establishments over 
the years 1995 to 2000 (217,575 establishment-years), the six-year period that followed the EPA’s largest 
expansion of the TRI chemical list.  
Dependent variable 
We measure environmental performance based on toxic chemical emissions data from the TRI database, a 
widely used approach (e.g., Berrone et al., 2010; Bui and Kapon, 2012; Chatterji and Toffel, 2010; 
Gamper-Rabindran, 2006; King and Lenox, 2000; King and Shaver, 2001; Toffel and Marshall, 2004). In 
November 1994, the EPA added 243 toxic chemicals to the 363 already required to be reported, effective 
in 1995 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1994). Our outcome measure is log releases of these 
243 chemicals; it includes the total pounds each firm reported to the TRI as production waste, transfers 
offsite, and emissions. We obtained TRI data from the EPA’s Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators 
(RSEI) Model (versions 2.1.2 and 2.1.3) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2010). Our models use 
the log of these annual values after adding one.  Whereas some studies apply various weights to these 
chemicals to account for differences in toxicity, simply summing the pounds of emissions was a 13 
 
commonly used approach by the media and prominent nonprofit organizations and in government 
publications during the sample period (Toffel and Marshall, 2004) as well as by academic studies 
examining institutional pressure and responses to TRI releases (e.g., Chatterji and Toffel, 2010; Dooley 
and Fryxell, 1999; Feldman, Soyka, and Ameer, 1997; Konar and Cohen, 2001). 
Moderators 
Headquarters proximity 
We measure proximity to headquarters as a dichotomous variable, proximate headquarters, coded ‘1’ for 
establishments located in the same city as their headquarters and ‘0’ otherwise. We obtained 
establishment addresses from the TRI database and headquarters addresses from the NETS database. To 
cleanly identify the effect of the 1995 policy change on firm behavior, we pursue the customary practice 
of measuring the hypothesized establishment-level characteristics fixed at their value in 1994, just prior to 
the policy change. In the absence of a 1994 value, we use an establishment’s 1993 value.
4 We use this 
practice for all hypothesized moderators described below, but all our results are very similar when we use 
time-variant moderators, as described in the robustness tests section below. 
Sibling proximity 
Our measure of the extent to which an establishment’s poor performance might impugn the reputation of 
other establishments in its corporate family is based on whether there are any TRI-reporting sibling 
establishments in the same city.
5 We created proximate sibling as a dichotomous, establishment-level, 
time-invariant variable coded ‘1’ for establishments with at least one sibling in the same city in 1994 and 
‘0’ otherwise. We obtained the identities and addresses of each establishment’s siblings from the NETS 
database.  
                                                      
4 Our results were substantively similar when headquarters proximity is measured as sharing the same three-digit 
ZIP code or the same state (see Columns 1–2 of Table B1 in Appendix B in the online Appendices).   
5 Our results were substantively similar when sibling proximity is measured as sharing the same three-digit ZIP code 
(Column 3 of Table B1 in Appendix B). Relying on a broader geographic definition of proximity (same county) also 
yields a negative coefficient, but one that is half the magnitude and not statistically significant (Column 4 of Table 
B1 in Appendix B: β = -0.008, p < 0.29). These results begin to sketch the boundaries that limit the geographic 
scope of reputation spillovers. 14 
 
Sibling proximity and industry similarity  
We created two dichotomous variables to indicate whether any of the focal establishment’s proximate 
siblings were in the same industry.
  We coded proximate same-industry sibling as ‘1’ if at least one 
proximate (same-city) sibling operated in the same industry (two-digit Standard Industrial Classification 
[SIC] code) and ‘0’ otherwise. Similarly, we coded proximate different-industry sibling as ‘1’ if at least 
one proximate (same-city) sibling operated in a different industry (two-digit SIC code) and ‘0’ otherwise. 
6 
Large establishments and regional density 
In H4, we predict that the power of large establishments is exacerbated in sparse regions, where such 
organizations are more salient, and attenuated in dense regions. As such, we measure organizational 
power via establishment size and salience via regional density. To identify the organizations most likely 
to possess the power to influence state regulatory agencies, we created large establishment as a 
dichotomous, time-invariant, establishment-level variable coded ‘1’ if an establishment’s employment in 
1994 exceeded the median employment of all TRI-reporting establishments in the same state that year and 
‘0’ otherwise. We obtained employment levels from NETS. Though our threshold differs by state, 
national averages for large and small establishments are 406 and 36 employees, respectively. We 
distinguish the salience of large employers by considering regional density. We distinguish sparse from 
dense regions based on the density of TRI-reporting establishments in a city. Specifically, we define a 
sparse city as a city with no more TRI-reporting establishments in 1994 than the median number of 10.5 
for all U.S. cities that year; a dense city is defined as a city with more TRI-reporting establishments in 
1994 than the median city.
7  
                                                      
6 Our results are similar when we adopt a narrower definition of same-industry—sharing a three-digit SIC code 
(Column 1 of Table B2 in Appendix B)—and when we adopt a broader definition of geographic proximity—sharing 
a three-digit ZIP code or being in the same county (Columns 2–3 of Table B2). 
7 As described below, our results are robust to alternative definitions of regional density, including a dummy 
variable based on the number of establishments per county and a continuous measure based on the number of 
establishments per city. 15 
 
Public ownership 
We created a dichotomous, time-invariant, establishment-level variable, public ownership, coded ‘1’ if, in 
1994, an establishment was owned by a publicly traded firm and ‘0’ if owned by a privately owned firm, 
based on data from the NETS database.  
Controls  
We obtained control variables to account for the possibility that establishments’ emissions are influenced 
by its historic performance, changes in its production levels, its industry, and its local community.  
Historical performance trends 
Our analysis examines the environmental performance trends of toxic chemical emissions in the first few 
years after public disclosure was required. One concern is that the performance trends that became 
publicly observable with the new disclosure requirements had already been occurring, but were known 
only to the establishments. While we cannot observe earlier trends for the 243 chemicals added to the TRI 
in 1995, we can observe them for the original 363 TRI chemicals whose reporting had been required 
before the 1995 policy change. We calculated each establishment’s historical releases trend based on the 
other toxic chemicals that were required to be reported from 1991 to 1994, the years immediately 
preceding the 1995 expansion. Specifically, for each establishment i, we calculated a percent change 
metric that is robust to outliers, using the following equation that takes the difference between emissions 
averaged over 1993 and 1994 (denoted 1993–1994) and the emissions averaged over 1991 and 1992 (denoted 
1991–1992):  
historical releases trendi = (average log releasesi,1993–1994 – average log releasesi,1991–1992) /  
(0.5×average log releasesi,1993–1994 + 0.5×average log releases i,1991–1992) 
By construction, this metric allays concerns arising from outliers by limiting the range from –2 to +2.  16 
 
To control for the influence of historical performance trends (1991–1994) on establishments’ 
subsequent performance trends (1995 and after), we add to our model historical releases trend as well as 
the interaction between historical releases trend and an annual counter (defined below).
8  
Establishment size  
We control for changes in establishment size in two ways.  We obtained establishments’ annual 
employment (Aravind and Christmann, 2011; Chatterji and Toffel, 2010; Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2011; 
King and Lenox, 2000; King, Lenox, and Terlaak, 2005; Potoski and Prakash, 2005; Russo and Harrison, 
2005) from NETS. Mean employment of the establishments in our sample is 227 (SD = 589). To reduce 
skew, we used log employment in our models. 
We also controlled for changes in production volume by obtaining annual production ratios (i.e., 
the ratio of an establishment’s production level in a given year to its production level the prior year) from 
the TRI database (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Lenox and King, 2004; Scorse, 2010; Terlaak and 
King, 2006). Establishments are required to provide an annual production ratio for each chemical reported 
to the TRI database. For establishments that reported multiple production ratios in a given year (e.g., for 
different production lines in a plant), we used the median value for the establishment-year. Across the 
distribution of median annual establishment production ratios, we winsorized at the 5th and 95th 
percentiles to avoid undue influence from outliers. We then linearly interpolated missing interior 
production ratio values to arrive at production ratioi,t for establishment i in year t. We normalized relative 
production ratioi,1994 to ‘1’ and calculated relative production leveli,t  for each subsequent year for 
establishment i in year t as follows:  
relative production leveli,t = ∏            	      ,    
       (production ratioi,y) 
                                                      
8 Because historical releases trend was sometimes undefined, owing to an establishment’s total releases throughout 
1991–1994 being below the reporting threshold or actually zero, we recoded missing values to zero and created a 
dummy variable to indicate these instances of recoding. We included in the regression both this dummy variable and 
its interaction with the annual counter. 17 
 
In our regressions, we include the log of relative production level to match our log dependent variable and 
a dummy variable coded ‘1’ if an observation’s value was based on an interpolated production ratio and 
‘0’ otherwise.
9 
Local environmental preferences 
Some prior studies have highlighted the influence of community environmental pressures on 
establishments’ environmental management practices (e.g., Delmas and Toffel, 2008; Hamilton, 1999). 
Like others, we measure community environmental pressures using the League of Conservation Voters 
(LCV) National Environmental Scorecard, which calculates the proportion of environmental bills favored 
by each member of the U.S. Congress and ranges from 0 to 100 percent. We use the Congressional 
district LCV score, which captures the voting record of the U.S. House of Representative member from 
the establishment’s Congressional district. 
Industry 
Toxic chemical emissions being, in part, a function of industry activities (Berrone et al., 2010; Diestre 
and Rajagopalan, 2011; King and Lenox, 2000; Potoski and Prakash, 2005), we control for differences 
between industries by including a full set of industry dummies based on two-digit SIC codes, using NETS 
data. To facilitate model convergence, we collapsed relatively rare SIC codes—those with fewer than 100 
establishment-year observations in each of our samples—into a single ‘other’ category.  
Summary statistics and correlations are reported in Table 1. The distribution of industries in our 
sample is reported in Table A1 in Appendix A the online Appendices. 
*************************** 
Insert Table 1 here 
                                                      
9 Including relative production level in our models provides an additional, albeit incomplete, way to control for 
changes in establishment size, augmenting annual employment used by other scholars (e.g., Grant and Jones, 2003; 
Klassen and Whybark, 1999; King and Lenox, 2000; Russo, 2009). However, after interpolating 2.8 percent of 
production ratio values, 62 percent of the relative production level values remained missing due to widespread 
missing values of production ratios. While we followed standard practice of recoding those missing values to ‘0’ and 
adding to our models a dummy variable indicating such recoding, the high number of recoded missing values 
nonetheless led us to also estimate alternative models that omitted relative production values. The results of these 
models that relied entirely on log employment to control for changes in establishment size (not shown) are very 
similar to and corroborate our primary findings. 18 
 
*************************** 
EMPIRICAL APPROACH  
Model specification 
Establishments are required to report to the EPA only those toxic chemical emissions that exceed specific 
TRI reporting thresholds. As a result, our dependent variable, log releases, is missing (left-censored) in 
years during which an establishment’s emissions fall below the thresholds. Prior research indicates that 
establishments for which emissions dip below reporting thresholds generally continue to use these 
chemicals, which suggests that there are unreported emissions and that treating such missing values as 
zero would likely result in biased estimates (Bennear, 2008). We therefore estimate an interval regression 
whereby left-censored observations of the latent dependent variable,    , 
∗ , are specified to range between 0 
and the most recent level of log releases reported by establishment i prior to year t. If the establishment 
has no prior reported level, we set the top end of the range to the minimum positive value of log releases 
reported by other establishments that year.
10 We estimate the following model for establishment i in year 
t: 
   , 
∗  	        	   	    	    	               	   	    	         ,      ,  
   represents the time-invariant moderator described above,    is an annual counter (0 in 1995, 1 in 
1996, and so on) that captures the secular trend, Hi represents the historical release trend, and Xi,t 
represents the remaining control variables (log employment, log relative production level, production 
ratio interpolated, Congressional district LCV score, and industry dummies). This model estimates 
comparative trends because it includes (1) an annual counter,   , that estimates the secular trend of the 
                                                      
10 Employing interval regression enables us to leverage the insights of Bennear (2008), who found that, among 
instances in which establishments stop reporting a chemical to TRI, nearly two-thirds of the time they continued to 
use the chemical, but in quantities below the reporting threshold.  As a robustness test, we also used an alternative 
coding of our dependent variable: For all missing values, we coded the top end of the range to the minimum positive 
value of log releases reported by other establishments that year. The results were nearly identical. As an additional 
robustness test described below, our OLS estimates with establishment-level fixed effects replicates Bennear’s 
(2008) approach to generating lower bound estimates by assuming that when an establishment ceases reporting, the 
true value of its releases is indeed zero. 19 
 
comparison group and (2) an interaction term between the counter and the moderator, which estimates the 
incremental secular trend of the moderator group (Campbell and Stanley, 1963: 11; Lewis-Beck and 
Alford, 1980). We rely on the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficient on this interaction 
term,  1, to identify whether the moderator group’s trend differs significantly from the comparison 
group’s trend, which is estimated via the coefficient on the main counter variable, 3.  
Identification 
Our identification strategy relies on the exogenous policy shock that occurred in 1995 when the EPA 
increased the number of chemicals required to be reported to the TRI from 363 to 606. Our analysis 
compares how various types of establishment responded to this. Specifically, we compare performance 
trends during a six-year period from in 1995, the year the new chemicals were added, to 2000.  
Hypotheses 2 and 3 predict behaviors based on the relationship between a focal establishment and 
its siblings. To sharpen the identification, our empirical analysis of these hypotheses is based on a sample 
restricted to establishments with at least one TRI-reporting sibling. This enables us, when testing H2, to 
compare the behavior of establishments with proximate siblings to that of establishments with non-
proximate siblings and, when testing H3, to compare performance trends between (a) establishments with 
intra-firm access to knowledge and capabilities from proximate siblings in the same industry and (b) 
establishments with proximate siblings in different industries.  
To estimate how density moderates the behavior of large organizations (Hypothesis 4), we first 
examine whether in sparse cities the performance trend of large establishments lags that of small 
establishments. We then compare the performance trends of large to small establishments in dense cities. 
Finally, we use seemingly unrelated regression to test whether the gap in performance trends between 
large and small establishments in the sparse cities exceeds the corresponding gap in dense cities. 
Comparing these two difference-in-differences estimates is akin to a triple-difference approach (i.e., 
differences-in-differences-in-differences), which has been used in many domains to facilitate comparisons 20 
 
across two groups in two different contexts (e.g., Basker and Noel, 2009; Costa and Kahn, 2000; Currie et 
al., 2009; Gruber, 1994). 
RESULTS  
We estimate our models using interval regression and include each interaction term in a separate 
regression model. In all cases, we report standard errors clustered by establishment and include dummy 
variables coded ‘1’ if relative production level, log employment, or Congressional district LCV score was 
recoded from missing to zero and coded ‘0’ otherwise (Greene, 2008: 62; Maddala, 1977: 202). This 
approach, common in econometric analysis, is algebraically equivalent to recoding missing values with 
the variable’s mean (Greene, 2008: 62). Our primary results are reported in Table 2, of which Column 1 
presents the results of a regression including only the control variables as a baseline reference.
11 
************************ 
Insert Table 2 here 
************************ 
Headquarters proximity 
The model displayed in Column 2 includes the interaction between the secular trend and proximate 
headquarters. The results indicate that establishments in the same city as their headquarters exhibited a 
superior environmental performance trend compared to establishments with more distant headquarters (β 
= -0.051, p < 0.01), which supports Hypothesis 1. This interaction-term coefficient represents the average 
annual difference in emissions trends between these two groups of establishments. To interpret the 
magnitude of this effect, we note the positive annual trend among establishments with headquarters in a 
different city (the baseline group) (β = 0.087, p < 0.01), which equates to an average increase of 0.52 log 
points over our six-year sample period (1995–2000) (calculated as 0.087*6) and an increase of 59 percent 
beyond the log releases sample mean of 0.88 log points. In contrast, the average headquarters-proximate 
establishment increased log releases by just 0.22 log points (calculated as [0.087–0.051]*6), 25 percent of 
                                                      
11 Results are also presented graphically in Figures A1 to A4 in the online Appendix A. 21 
 
the sample mean. Given that the latter constitutes less than half the growth rate of the former, we 
conclude that this statistically significant difference is also a substantial one.
12  
Reputation spillover 
To analyze the effects of a proximate sibling, we restrict the sample to establishments with at least one 
TRI-reporting corporate sibling and control for the number of siblings (fixed at their 1994 values, then 
logged). The results in Column 3 reveal that establishments with proximate siblings exhibit a superior 
performance trend compared to establishments with non-proximate siblings (β = -0.020, p < 0.02), which 
supports Hypothesis 2. The average annual trend among establishments with non-proximate siblings (β = 
0.091, p < 0.01) implies a total 0.55-log-point increase over the six-year sample period. In comparison, 
establishments with proximate siblings increased log releases by 0.43 log points, a 22 percent lower 
growth rate.  
Capabilities transfer 
To test Hypothesis 3, we restrict the sample to establishments with at least one TRI-reporting corporate 
sibling and control for the (log) number of siblings in 1994 (as we did earlier to estimate the overall 
proximity effect). The results reported in Column 4 indicate that the performance improvement among 
establishments with proximate same-industry siblings (β = -0.036, p < 0.01) significantly outpaces that of 
establishments with proximate different-industry siblings (β = 0.023, p < 0.17; Wald χ
2 comparing 
coefficients = 9.12, p < 0.01), which supports Hypothesis 3. Establishments with proximate same-industry 
siblings increased total releases by 0.33 log points over the six-year sample period. By comparison, 
establishments with proximate different-industry siblings increased total releases by 0.68 log points.  
Large establishments and regional density 
Among establishments in sparse regions (cities with fewer TRI-reporters than the sample median), we 
find a greater increase in log releases among larger establishments than among smaller ones (Column 5: β 
                                                      
12 We comment on and graph the increasing secular trends in Appendix A in the online Appendices. 22 
 
= 0.037, p < 0.01). In dense regions (the opposite subsample: cities with more TRI-reporters than the 
sample median), we find virtually no difference in the performance trends between small and large 
establishments (Column 6: β = -0.007, p < 0.41). To test whether the performance gap observed in sparse 
regions was significantly attenuated in dense regions, we estimated a seemingly unrelated regression that 
simultaneously estimated these two models. The results revealed a statistically significant difference 
between these two interaction-term coefficients of opposing signs (Wald 
2 = 15.20, p < 0.01). These 
results support the contention in Hypothesis 4 that density mitigates the power of large establishments to 
resist institutional pressures.  
What is the magnitude of these differences? In sparse regions, the positive (worsening) 
performance trend of smaller establishments (the baseline group) (β = 0.043, p < 0.01) amounts to a 0.26-
log-point increase in log releases over the six-year sample period. In contrast, larger establishments 
increased  log releases by 0.48 log points, nearly twice (1.8 times) the increase of the smaller 
establishments. In dense regions, annual growth among smaller establishments (β = 0.065, p < 0.01), the 
baseline in the regression, amounts to 0.39 log points of log releases over six years. In contrast, larger 
establishments experienced an average total increase of 0.35 log points, 90 percent of that of the smaller 
establishments.  
We also considered a continuous measure of density (Log establishments in city), defined as the 
log of the number of TRI-reporting establishments in the focal establishment’s city in 1994. We interacted 
this continuous variable with both the annual counter and large establishment, estimated the model on the 
full sample (all regions), and report results in Column 7. The statistically significant negative coefficient 
on the triple interaction term (β = -0.019; p<0.01) indicates that the faster pace of increases in total 
releases among larger establishments (compared to smaller ones) (β = 0.063; p<0.01) is attenuated in 
denser regions where such organizations have less political power. This additional evidence indicates that 
our empirical support for Hypothesis 4 is not sensitive to measuring regional density dichotomously. 23 
 
Public ownership 
As reported in Column 8, average environmental performance trends were better for privately held 
establishments than for publicly owned establishments (β = 0.073, p < 0.01), which supports Hypothesis 
5b, but not Hypothesis 5a. The average annual trend of publicly owned establishments (0.041 + 0.073 = 
0.114) was nearly triple (2.8 times) the average annual trend of privately owned establishments (β = 
0.041, p < 0.01). Over the six-year sample period, these average trends amount to total emissions 
increasing by 0.068 log points (77% of the sample mean) for establishments with publicly owned parent 
firms, compared to 0.25 log points (28% of the sample mean) for establishments with privately held 
parent firms.  
Robustness tests  
We conducted a number of robustness tests to assess the sensitivity of our results with respect to model 
specification, moderator measurement, and subsampling strategy.  
Alternative specifications 
As an alternative to interval regression, we reestimated our models using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
with establishment-level fixed effects, an approach used by others to estimate toxic chemical emissions 
from the TRI database (e.g., Hanna and Oliva, 2010; King and Lenox, 2000; Russo, 2009). We continue 
to cluster standard errors by establishment. The OLS fixed-effects results, reported in Table 3, support our 
hypotheses, just as our primary interval regression models do. Estimates using a first-differences 
approach (Wooldridge, 2000: 429), described in the online Appendix B and reported in Table B3, yield 
inferences very similar to those generated by our models estimated with interval and fixed-effects 
regression. 
************************ 




Time-varying moderators  
In our primary analysis, we fixed the moderators at their values in 1994, the year before the policy change 
(or at their 1993 values if 1994 values were missing). In our analysis period of 1995 to 2000, we found no 
annual variation in proximate headquarters status. Less than 1 percent of establishments experienced a 
change in their proximate sibling value or in their proximate same-industry sibling value. In contrast, 10 
percent of the establishments experienced a change in their annual ‘large establishment’ status and 13 
percent experienced a change in their annual public ownership status. We therefore examined whether our 
primary results were sensitive to fixing their values based on their status in 1994 (or 1993). In particular, 
we estimated models in which we reassigned moderator values based on each year of the sample.
13 
Overall, these results, reported in Table B4 in the online Appendix B, are substantively similar to our 
primary results, with the exception of Hypothesis 4, where the difference between large and small 
establishments in sparse versus dense regions was no longer statistically significant (Wald 
2 = 2.04, p < 
0.16). Overall, these results indicate that our analysis is largely robust to whether we code moderator 
values based on their 1993–1994 values or set their values annually throughout the sample period. 
Alternative measurement of establishment size and regional density  
In our primary test of Hypothesis 4, concerning the moderating effect of local density on the relative 
improvement of large and small establishments, we measured density at the city level and considered 
establishments to be large if they employed more people than the median establishment in their state. As 
robustness tests, we considered several alternative measures of regional density and establishment size. 
Categorizing sparse versus dense communities based on the number of TRI establishments in the 
same county being less or greater than the nationwide county median of 39 yields additional support for 
Hypothesis 4 (Columns 1–2 of Table B5 in the online Appendix B).  Next, as an alternative measure of 
density, we distinguished between cities with low versus high employment. Specifically, we identify low-
                                                      
13 Because our moderators are unlikely to be affected by our outcome measure (log releases), these annual 
assignments are unlikely to risk endogeneity concerns that might bias our estimates. 25 
 
employment cities as those with no more than the median city TRI employment of 1,500 and high-
employment cities as those with greater than the median of 1,500 TRI employees in the city. Comparing 
the relative improvement of large and small establishments across both types of cities (Columns 3 and 4 
of Table B5) yields results consistent with our primary specification.  
We also assessed the sensitivity of our results to our decision to measure large establishments as 
those whose employment exceeded the median establishment employment in their state. As alternative 
thresholds to categorize an establishment as large, we considered (a) whether its employment exceeds the 
top quartile of establishments in the state and (b) whether its employment exceeds the state average. 
These yielded results very similar to our primary results (Columns 5–8 of Table B5).
14 As a third 
alternative metric, we considered a continuous measure of establishment size. Because establishment size 
is meant to represent the establishment’s potential power to resist its state’s regulatory agency, we 
normalized employment of the focal establishment by deducting from it the average establishment 
employment for its state and dividing the result by the state standard deviation of employment in 1994. 
This yields a size metric that accommodates differences in levels and variation across states.  The results 
are reported in Columns 9 and 10 in Table B5. A Wald test indicates that the coefficient on this 
interaction term in dense cities is statistically significantly smaller than in sparse cities (Wald χ
2=10.34, 
p<0.01), which lends support to Hypothesis 4.  
As a final robustness test of Hypothesis 4, we include the interaction between our continuous size 
measure (establishment size), our continuous density measure (Log establishments in city), and the annual 
counter. The results of this model, reported in Table B6, yield a negative coefficient on this triple-
interaction term. Interpreted in light of the other interaction terms, this indicates that the faster pace of 
                                                      
14 In sparse cities, we continue to observe large establishments exhibiting significantly worse performance trends 
than smaller firms, whether we defined large as top quartile or above average (Columns 5 and 7, respectively, of 
Table B5: β=0.059, p<0.01 in both instances). In dense cities, we find little difference in performance between large 
and small establishments using either alternative measure (β=0.008 and β=0.016 in Columns 6 and 8, respectively; 
neither is statistically significant). Seemingly unrelated regression analysis continues to indicate that the difference 
between these trends in sparse versus dense cities is statistically significant, whether large is defined as employment 
exceeding the state’s top quartile (Wald χ
2=13.22, p<0.01, Columns 5 vs. 6) or the state average (Wald χ
2=9.46, 
p<0.01, Columns 7 vs. 8). 26 
 
increase in total releases among larger establishments (compared to smaller ones) is attenuated in denser 
regions p<0.01), where such organizations have less political power, which provides additional support 
for Hypothesis 4.  
Collectively, these results (from Tables B5 and B6) indicate that support for Hypothesis 4 is not 
sensitive to the particular metric used to measure establishment size, the particular definition of 
sparseness, or whether the moderator is dichotomous or continuous. 
Controlling for parent company size 
Though we do not have comprehensive data on parent company size, we developed some proxies based 
on the TRI database and corresponding NETS data. For each establishment-year, we calculated the annual 
log number of TRI-reporting siblings and created a dummy indicating whether or not each establishment 
has any TRI-reporting siblings that year. We also calculated company-wide log employment (TRI-
reporters) by taking the log of total employment of these sibling establishments and the focal 
establishment using NETS data (King and Lenox, 2000). We estimated interval regression models that 
included these three parent-level controls, clustering standard errors at the firm level. The results of these 
models (not shown) are nearly identical to those of our primary models, which suggests that our results 
are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of parent-level size proxies in our models. 
DISCUSSION 
Our analysis reveals that organizational characteristics influence the degree to which establishments 
improve their environmental performance in response to mandatory information disclosure. Below, we 
describe how our study contributes to the literatures on information disclosure and institutional theory.  
Contributions to information disclosure research 
Mandating information disclosure as a means of regulating organizational behavior has become more 
prevalent in recent years, yet the circumstances under which these programs change organizations’ 
actions are only beginning to be understood (Fung et al., 2007; Toffel and Short, 2011). The need for 27 
 
evaluation is especially great in the field of environmental policy, in which information disclosure is 
especially prevalent and has been referred to as the ‘third wave’ of policy instruments, following earlier 
eras of command-and-control (e.g., technology mandates) and market-based mechanisms such as tradable 
permits (Delmas, Montes-Sancho, and Shimshack, 2010; Tietenberg, 1998). In this paper, we identify 
several key organizational attributes that moderate the effect of information disclosure mandates on 
organizational performance. We obtain five significant results. First, establishments near their firm’s 
headquarters improve more rapidly than other establishments. Second, establishments proximate to 
corporate siblings improve more rapidly. Third, establishments with proximate siblings in the same 
industry improve more rapidly than those with proximate siblings in different industries.  Fourth, density 
mitigates the power of large establishments to resist institutional pressures: large establishments improve 
more slowly than small establishments in sparse regions, but both groups improve similarly in dense 
regions. Finally, establishments that belong to publicly traded firms improve more slowly than those 
owned by privately held firms.  
The findings related to proximity to headquarters and to corporate siblings suggest that firms are 
particularly careful to protect their images close to their headquarters and clustered operations. Prior 
research has argued that firms are embedded in their headquarters’ communities and hence are more 
concerned with their reputations within those communities (Audia and Ryder, 2010; Marquis and 
Battilana, 2009). Our results are consistent with this and further suggest that embeddedness can occur 
with respect not only to headquarters but also to clusters of establishments within a region.  
We note that our result regarding headquarters proximity contradicts recent research in sociology. 
Grant, Jones, and Trautner (2004) find no difference in pollution rates between establishments that are in 
the same state as their headquarters and those that are not. Their analysis, however, considered absolute 
levels of emissions rather than improvement over time and their use of a broader geographic region might 
mute the effects of both community embeddedness and transfer of capabilities. 
One explanation for our proximity results is that proximity enhances the transfer of capabilities 
(Berchicci et al., 2011), including the capabilities needed to improve a disclosed poor performance.  Our 28 
 
result that establishments with proximate siblings in the same industry demonstrate more rapid 
improvement suggests that capability transfer is a significant mechanism by which establishments 
improve following disclosure.  It is, of course, possible that both pressure from siblings and capability 
transfer facilitate improvement. Future research should attempt to isolate these effects further and 
ascertain when one mechanism dominates the other. 
Our results with respect to establishment size suggest that the density of local manufacturing 
establishments moderates the effect of size on improvement. In relatively dense areas, the visibility of 
large establishments appears to outweigh the power they possess, whereas in sparse areas, they seem 
more able to exercise their power. Our results extend findings in sociology regarding the size-
environmental performance relationship that suggest that large establishments can abuse their powerful 
positions within society; for example, by creating disproportionate amounts of pollution (Freudenberg, 
2005; Grant et al., 2002).  
Contributions to institutional theory 
Institutional theory is particularly well suited to illuminating how external pressures affect organizations. 
Of particular importance to strategic management scholarship is the need to refine institutional theory to 
further our understanding of why firms respond differently to common institutional pressures. For 
example, why, among firms in similar institutional environments, do some implement environmental 
management strategies that go well beyond regulatory compliance requirements while others pursue more 
laggard approaches (Delmas and Toffel, 2012; Short and Toffel, 2010)? In particular, what organizational 
attributes moderate the effects of institutional pressures? 
Our findings suggest that institutional pressures are especially influential on organizations with 
particular characteristics and capabilities. We show that organizational features moderate the effect of 
community pressures, a phenomenon worthy of greater attention (Marquis and Battalina, 2009). Our work 
extends prior research showing that firms’ embeddedness in their headquarters cities influences their 
actions (Greenwood et al., 2010; Lounsbury, 2007). Our findings go beyond prior studies by explicitly 29 
 
contrasting responses to institutional pressures by establishments near their headquarters with those of 
establishments farther from their headquarters. Our results suggest that institutional pressures are 
intensified by internal pressure to improve performance, especially when the headquarters has a direct 
interest in avoiding damaging its (and the establishment’s) relationship with its home community. Our 
data do not allow us to distinguish the effects of increased external pressure due to being proximate to 
headquarters from the effects of internal pressure from the headquarters itself.  Disentangling these effects 
is a fruitful avenue for future research. 
Our results that privately held establishments improve more rapidly than publicly traded 
establishments are somewhat surprising, given that prior research has shown that publicly traded firms 
have significantly lower environmental management system (EMS) implementation costs than privately 
held firms (Darnall and Edwards, 2006). Given this, one might expect the cost of acquiescing to pressure 
to improve environmental performance also to be lower for such firms, but, in fact, we find that it is the 
establishments owned by privately held firms that are more likely to improve under pressure. Our findings 
suggest that, at least in our context, privately held firms’ resource constraints might be outweighed by 
their susceptibility to pressures that accompany information disclosure and their willingness to make 
investments without regard to short-term financial market reactions. Future research is required to 
distinguish the mechanisms underlying these results. For establishments owned by publicly traded 
companies, greater pressure to achieve growth (Mascarenhas, 1989) might deter investments in 
environmental improvement projects with less certain returns or longer payback periods. In contrast, 
establishments owned by privately held firms, which generally have more concentrated ownership, might 
be more willing and able to undertake projects that create other (nonfinancial) forms of utility valued by 
their owners, which Berrone et al. (2010) refer to as ‘socioemotional wealth.’ 
Our finding with regard to establishment size helps resolve the seemingly contradictory 
arguments posited in prior research about whether larger or smaller organizations are more responsive to 
institutional pressure. Our results demonstrate that understanding the effect of an organization’s size 
requires understanding its context. Our finding that larger establishments tend to perform worse over time 30 
 
than smaller ones in sparse regions suggests that, in this context, a larger establishment’s power to resist 
local pressure trumps its need for legitimacy.   
Implications for policymakers and managers  
For policymakers designing information disclosure programs, our results suggest that a program’s 
effectiveness depends in part on the industrial organization of its target population. For example, 
industries largely populated by establishments owned by privately held firms may be more responsive to 
information disclosure programs than industries populated by establishments owned by publicly traded 
firms. Understanding and anticipating such differences can help regulators improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of targeting schemes that supplement information disclosure so as to exert more pressure on 
laggards. 
For corporate managers, our results suggest the need to be aware of how organizational features 
are likely to affect subsidiary establishments’ responsiveness to information disclosure programs, which 
might in turn affect the firm’s actions or its reputation. For example, our finding that information 
disclosure prompts greater performance improvement among establishments closer to headquarters might 
lead some corporate managers to provide extra support for (and/or exert more pressure on) more remote 
establishments.  
CONCLUSION 
Organizations exhibit heterogeneous responses to institutional pressure created by information disclosure 
programs. Our analysis of changes in establishments’ environmental performance following expansion of 
the EPA’s TRI program suggests that organizational characteristics explain some of this heterogeneity. 
With information disclosure programs proliferating, our findings on factors that magnify or dampen their 
effectiveness become more salient. In identifying establishment-level as well as intra-organizational 
attributes associated with heterogeneous responses to institutional pressure, we contribute to an important 
literature that seeks to leverage institutional theory to explain heterogeneous organizational strategies.  31 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A. Summary statistics 
 
      Obs  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
1.  Log releases (toxic chemicals added in 1995)  222,349  0.88  2.86  0.00  17.11 
2. Proximate  headquarters93/94 218,440  0.38  0.49  0.00  1.00 
3. Proximate  sibling93/94 222,349  0.11  0.31  0.00  1.00 
4.  Proximate same-industry sibling93/94 222,349  0.09  0.28  0.00  1.00 
5. Proximate  different-industry sibling93/94 222,349  0.04  0.19  0.00  1.00 
6. Large  establishment93/94 167,592  0.51  0.50  0.00  1.00 
7. Public  ownership93/94 162,412  0.28  0.45  0.00  1.00 
8. Historical  releases  trend  222,349  -0.01  0.84  -2.00  2.00 
9.  Relative production level  222,349  0.09  0.30  -1.89  3.46 
10. Log  employment  222,349  3.59  2.16  0.00  10.09 
11.  Congressional district LCV score  222,349  0.42  0.35  0.00  1.00 
 
 
Panel B. Pairwise correlations 
 
        1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.  10. 
1. Log releases (toxic chemicals added in 1995)   1.00
2. Proximate headquarters93/94 -0.08 1.00
3. Proximate sibling93/94 0.02 0.00 1.00
4. Proximate same-industry sibling93/94 0.01 0.02 0.86 1.00
5. Proximate different-industry sibling93/94 0.02 -0.04 0.55 0.13 1.00 
6. Large establishment93/94 0.09 -0.21 0.07 0.07 0.03  1.00 
7. Public ownership93/94  0.10 -0.41 0.09 0.05 0.12 0.26 1.00
8.  Historical  releases  trend  0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.06 1.00
9. Relative production level  0.12 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.05  0.02 0.06 1.00
10.  Log  employment  0.07 -0.09 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.66 0.28 -0.02 0.05 1.00
11. Congressional district LCV score  0.01 0.08 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01  -0.04  -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02
 
Note: 93/94 denotes dummy variable whose value is based on establishment status in 1994 (or, if missing, in 1993), before the policy 
change that occurred in 1995. 37 
 
Table 2. Interval regression results 
Dependent variable: Log releases 
 


















Proximate headquarters93/94  ×  Annual  counter    -0.051**        
  [0.005]        
Proximate sibling93/94  ×  Annual  counter     -0.020*       
   [0.009]       
Proximate same-industry sibling93/94  ×  Annual       -0.036**      
      Counter      [0.009]      
Proximate different-industry sibling93/94  ×        0.023      
      Annual  counter      [0.016]      
Large establishment93/94  ×  Annual  counter       0.037**  -0.007  0.063**   
     [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.011]   
Large establishment93/94  ×  Log  establishments          -0.019**   
   per city93/94  ×  Annual  counter         [0.004]   
Public ownership93/94  ×  Annual  counter          0.073** 
        [0.007] 
Proximate headquarters93/94    - 0 . 0 3 9         
  [0.025]        
Proximate sibling93/94     0.087+       
   [0.046]       
Proximate same-industry sibling93/94      0.121*      
    [0.052]      
Proximate different-industry sibling93/94      - 0 . 0 4 3       
    [0.079]      
Large establishment93/94       -0.172**  -0.088  -0.144*   
     [0.060]  [0.065]  [0.065]   
Large establishment93/94  ×           0.004   
   Log establishments in city93/94         [0.020]   
Log establishments in city93/94  ×  Annual  counter         0.010**   
         [0.003]   
Log establishments in city93/94         -0.033**   
         [0.011]   
Public ownership93/94          - 0 . 0 0 4  
        [0.038] 
Annual  counter  0.077** 0.087** 0.091** 0.091** 0.043** 0.065** 0.029** 0.041** 
[0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.005] 
Historical releases trend  -0.088**  -0.110**  -0.128** -0.128** -0.101** -0.077** -0.093** -0.096** 
[0.015] [0.015] [0.021] [0.021] [0.023] [0.023] [0.016] [0.017] 
Historical releases trend × Annual counter    0.008** 0.012** 0.012** 0.008*  0.008*  0.008** 0.010** 
  [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] 
Log number of siblings (in 1994)      0.043**  0.043**         
   [0.011]  [0.012]      
Relative production level  0.202** 0.201** 0.184** 0.184** 0.143+ 0.180* 0.167**  0.161** 
[0.052] [0.052] [0.070] [0.070] [0.082] [0.081] [0.058] [0.058] 
Log  employment  0.220** 0.207** 0.254** 0.254** 0.281** 0.277** 0.277** 0.247** 
[0.012] [0.012] [0.016] [0.016] [0.025] [0.027] [0.018] [0.014] 
Congressional district LCV score  0.025 0.053 0.017 0.017 0.086  -0.027 0.038 0.023 
[0.034] [0.034] [0.048] [0.048] [0.057] [0.054] [0.039] [0.039] 
Industry (2-digit SIC) dummies  Included  Included  Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations  222,349 218,440 138,888 138,888 86,925  80,667 167,592  162,412 
Number of establishments  38,634  37,952 23,918 23,918 15,148 14,210 29,358 28,477 
Wald test: Are coefficients on both interaction terms 
equal? (
2 statistic)      9.12**  15.20**    
 
All models estimated with interval regression (left-censored). Brackets contain standard errors clustered by establishment; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + 
p<0.10. All samples include establishment-years during 1995–2000. The dependent variable is log (plus 1) of total releases reported to TRI of the 
243 toxic chemicals that were added to the TRI chemical list in 1995. These total releases include those reported as production waste, transfers 
offsite, and emissions to air, land, water, and underground injection. All models also include a dummy to indicate observations for which the value of 
relative production level was interpolated and observations for which historical releases trend, relative production level, log employment, and 
Congressional district LCV score were missing. The dummy indicating missing observations for historical releases trend is interacted with the 
annual counter. 93/94 denotes a dummy variable whose value is based on establishment status in 1994 (or, if missing, in 1993), before the policy 
change that occurred in 1995.  38 
 
Table 3. OLS establishment-level fixed-effects regression estimates 
Dependent variable: Log releases 














Proximate headquarters93/94 × Annual counter  -0.040**           
[0.005]       
Proximate sibling93/94 × Annual counter    -0.020*         
  [0.009]      
Proximate same-industry sibling93/94 × Annual counter      -0.035**       
   [0.010]     
Proximate different-industry sibling93/94 × Annual counter      0.019       
   [0.017]     
Large establishment93/94 × Annual counter        0.015+  -0.030**   
    [0.008]  [0.008]   
Public ownership93/94  ×  Annual  counter        0.056** 
      [ 0 . 0 0 7 ]  
Annual  counter  0.068** 0.066** 0.066** 0.046** 0.065** 0.034** 
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.007] [0.004] 
Historical releases trend × Annual counter  0.003  0.006+  0.006+  0.005  0.001  0.004 
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] 
Relative  production  level  0.256** 0.310** 0.310** 0.174** 0.315** 0.256** 
[0.033] [0.044] [0.044] [0.046] [0.053] [0.036] 
Log employment  0.034**  0.028*  0.028*  0.032+  0.031  0.031* 
[0.010] [0.013] [0.013] [0.018] [0.019] [0.013] 
Congressional  district  LCV  score  0.008 0.002 0.002 0.034 0.035 0.041 
[0.028] [0.038] [0.038] [0.043] [0.046] [0.032] 
Establishment  fixed  effects  Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 218,440  138,888  138,888  86,925  80,667  162,412 
Number of establishments  37,952 23,918 23,918 15,148 14,210 28,477 
Wald test: Are coefficients on both interaction terms equal? 
(F-statistic)     7.48**  15.43**   
 
All models estimated with OLS regression with establishment fixed effects. Brackets contain standard errors clustered by 
establishment; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. All samples include establishment-years during 1995–2000. The dependent variable is 
log (plus 1) of total releases reported to TRI of the 243 toxic chemicals that were added to the TRI chemical list in 1995. These total 
releases include those reported as production waste, transfers offsite, and releases to air, land, water, and underground injection. The 
main effects of the hypothesized moderators (e.g., proximate headquarters) are time-invariant at the establishment level and thus are 
absorbed by the establishment fixed effects. All models also include a dummy to indicate observations for which the value of relative 
production level was interpolated and observations for which historical releases trend, relative production level, log employment, and 
Congressional district LCV score were missing. The dummy indicating missing observations for historical releases trend is interacted 
with the annual counter. 93/94 denotes a dummy variable whose value is based on establishment status in 1994 (or, if missing, in 1993), 
before the policy change that occurred in 1995. Appendix p. 1 
 
APPENDICES to Dosh, Dowell, and Toffel HOW FIRMS RESPOND TO MANDATORY 
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 
 
Appendix A provides  more information about the primary models by reporting the distribution of 
industries in the sample (Table A1), illustrating the hypothesized results by graphing predicted values 
(Figures A1-A5), and describing the increasing secular trends of emissions of the TRI chemicals that were 
first required to be reported in 1995. Appendix B reports results of several robustness tests described in 
the paper. 
APPENDIX A. ILLUSTRATING AND EXPLAINING PRIMARY RESULTS 
Table A1. Industry composition of sample  
SIC Industry  Number  of 
Establishments 
Percent 
17  Construction special trade contractors  216  0.6% 
20  Food and kindred products  2,809  7.4% 
22  Textile mill products  694  1.8% 
23  Apparel and other finished products made from fabrics and similar 
materials 
107 0.3% 
24  Lumber and wood products, except furniture  1,205  3.2% 
25  Furniture and fixtures  820  2.2% 
26  Paper and allied products  1,032  2.7% 
27  Printing, publishing, and allied industries  553  1.5% 
28  Chemicals and allied products  4,700  12.3% 
29  Petroleum refining and related industries  503  1.3% 
30  Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products  2,163  5.7% 
31  Leather and leather products  135  0.4% 
32  Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products  1,488  3.9% 
33 Primary  metal  industries  2,648  6.9% 
34  Fabricated metal products, except machinery and transportation 
equipment 
4,359 11.4% 
35  Industrial and commercial machinery and computer equipment  2,553  6.7% 
36  Electronic and other electrical equipment and components, except 
computer equipment 
2,593 6.8% 
37 Transportation  equipment  1,917  5.0% 
38  Measuring, analyzing, and controlling instruments; photographic, 
medical, and optical goods; watches and clocks 
875 2.3% 
39  Miscellaneous manufacturing industries  609  1.6% 
42  Motor freight transportation and warehousing  299  0.8% 
49  Electric, gas, and sanitary services  668  1.8% 
50 Wholesale  trade—durable  goods  973  2.6% 
51  Wholesale trade—non-durable goods  1,536  4.0% 
52  Building materials, hardware, garden supply, and mobile home dealers  125  0.3% 
55  Automotive dealers and gasoline service stations  279  0.7% 
59 Miscellaneous  retail  130  0.3% 
73 Business  services  412  1.1% 
76 Miscellaneous  repair  services  111  0.3% 
87  Engineering, accounting, research, management, and related services  315  0.8% 
 Other  1,348  3.5% 
 Total  38,175 100% 
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Figure A1. Establishments proximate to their headquarters exhibit a superior environmental 





Note. This figure displays average predicted log releases based on the model reported in Column 2 of 
Table 2. 
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Figure A2. Establishments with at least one proximate sibling exhibit a superior environmental 
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Figure A3. Establishments with at least one proximate same-industry sibling exhibit a superior 





Note. This figure displays average predicted log releases based on the model reported in Column 4 of 
Table 2. 
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Figure A4. Larger establishments exhibit worse environmental performance than smaller 
establishments in sparse regions (Panel A), but similar performance in dense regions (Panel B). 
Taken together, the performance of large establishments relative to small establishments diverges 






Panel C: Difference between predicted values of large versus small facilities 
 
Note. Panels A and B display average predicted log releases based on the models reported in Columns 5 
and 6, respectively, of Table 2. Panel C displays the average predicted log releases of large establishments 
less that of small facilities for both sparse and dense regions.  Appendix p. 6 
 
Figure A5. Privately-owned establishments exhibit a superior environmental performance trend 




Note. This figure displays average predicted log releases based on the model reported in Column 8 of 
Table 2. 
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Explanation of secular emissions trend 
EPA and other commentators have often claimed that the TRI program has led to dramatic 
reductions in the overall amount of toxic chemical emissions, a trend often based on the “core chemicals,” 
those chemicals that were consistently required to be reported (and with a consistent reporting threshold) 
throughout the comparison period.
1 In contrast, the average emissions the chemicals EPA added to TRI in 
1995 reported by establishments in our sample
2 increased from 12,439 pounds in 1995 to 17,921 pounds 
in 2000. The total amount of these newly-reported chemicals that these establishments reported increased 
from 482 million pounds in 1995 to 640 million pounds in 2000. The consistently positive, significant 
coefficient on annual counter in the models reported in Tables 2 and 3 reveals a positive secular trend 
during 1995 to 2000 in these emissions.  
 
   
                                                      
1 For example, see Connecticut Department of Energy & Environmental Protection. 2005. Connecticut’s 
management of toxic air pollutants. Available at 
http://www.ct.gov/dep/cwp/view.asp?a=2684&q=322238&depNav_GID=1619, last updated November 2005, 
accessed June 2012); S. Moulton  and C. Gregory. 2005. Dismantling the public's right to know: EPA's systematic 
weakening of the Toxic Release Inventory. Washington DC: OMB Watch; SM Wolf. 1996. Fear and loathing about 
the public right to know: the surprising success of the emergency planning and community right-to-know act. 
Journal of Land Use & Environmental Law 11(2): 217-325. 
2 For a TRI-reporting establishment to be included in our sample in a given year, it either had to report emissions of 
at least one TRI chemical in that or a future year, or the focal year had to precede or equal its final year of operation 
based on Dun & Bradstreet data. This definition enabled us to identify establishments that were alive in a given year 
despite their not reporting any newly added TRI chemicals. Appendix p. 8 
 
APPENDIX B. ROBUSTNESS TESTS  
 
First-differences OLS regression estimates 
As an additional robustness test, we estimated our models using a first-differences approach, which yields 
year-on-year change estimates and absorbs establishment-specific time-invariant factors (Wooldridge, 
2000: 429). In this model, our dependent variable is first-differenced log releasesi,t (calculated as log 
releasesi,t – log releasesi,t-1 for establishment i in year t).  We include as controls first differences of 
relative production ratio, log employees, and Congressional district LCV score (each calculated in the 
same fashion). First-differencing the counter used to estimate the comparison group’s secular trend yields 
‘1’ in all years, resulting in the constant term representing the estimated secular trend of the comparison 
group.  First-differencing our interaction terms (group membership interacted with the secular trend) 
yields a dummy variable indicating group membership. The coefficient on this dummy variable estimates 
the incremental trend of the group, above and beyond the comparison group’s trend represented by the 
constant term. We estimated this first-differences model using OLS and continued to cluster standard 
errors by establishment. The first-differences results, reported in Table B3, yield inferences very similar 
to those generated by our models estimated with interval regression, although the statistical significance 
level declines slightly in our test of Hypothesis 2 (to p < 0.07). 
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Table B1. Robustness tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2: Alternative definitions of proximate 
Dependent variable: Log releases 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 








      





Proximate headquarters93/94 × Annual counter  -0.052**  -0.043**     
[0.005] [0.005]     
Proximate sibling93/94 × Annual counter      -0.020**  -0.008 
   [0.007]  [0.008] 
Proximate headquarters93/94 -0.040  -0.003     
[0.025] [0.026]     
Proximate sibling93/94     0.119**  0.058 
   [0.040]  [0.041] 
Annual  counter  0.089** 0.089** 0.093** 0.089** 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
Historical  releases  trend  -0.110** -0.110** -0.128** -0.128** 
[0.015] [0.015] [0.021] [0.021] 
Historical releases trend × Annual counter  0.008**  0.008**  0.012**  0.012** 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] 
Log number of siblings93/94     0.042**  0.043** 
   [0.011]  [0.011] 
Relative production level  0.200**  0.201**  0.184**  0.184** 
[0.052] [0.052] [0.070] [0.070] 
Log  employment  0.207** 0.212** 0.253** 0.254** 
[0.012] [0.012] [0.016] [0.016] 
Congressional district LCV score  0.057+  0.051  0.016  0.014 
[0.034] [0.034] [0.048] [0.048] 
Industry (2-digit SIC) dummies  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Observations  218,440 218,440 138,888 138,888 
Number  of  establishments  37,952 37,952 23,918 23,918 
 
All models estimated with interval regression (left-censored). Brackets contain standard errors clustered by 
establishment; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. All samples include establishment-years during 1995–2000. The 
dependent variable is log (plus 1) of total releases reported to TRI of the 243 toxic chemicals that were added to the 
TRI chemical list in 1995. These total releases include those reported as production waste, transfers offsite, and 
releases to air, land, water, and underground injection. All models also include a dummy to indicate observations for 
which the value of relative production level was interpolated and observations for which historical releases trend, 
relative production level,  log employment, and Congressional district LCV score were missing. The dummy 
indicating missing observations for historical releases trend is interacted with the annual counter. 93/94 denotes a 
dummy variable whose value is based on establishment status in 1994 (or, if missing, in 1993), before the policy 
change that occurred in 1995. In the primary specification, proximity is based on city.  Appendix p. 10 
 
Table B2. Robustness tests of Hypothesis 3: Alternative definitions of proximate and same-industry 
Dependent variable: Log releases 







     
Proximate measured by common:  City  3-digit 
ZIP code 
County 
     






Proximate same-industry sibling93/94 × Annual counter  -0.036**  -0.023** -0.025**
[0.010] [0.008] [0.009] 
Proximate different-industry sibling93/94 × Annual counter  0.015  -0.000  0.028* 
[0.014] [0.011] [0.013] 
Proximate same-industry sibling93/94 0.096+  0.134** 0.078+ 
[0.052] [0.045] [0.047] 
Proximate different-industry sibling93/94 0.006  0.002  -0.032 
[0.073] [0.059] [0.063] 
Annual counter  0.090**  0.092** 0.089**
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
Historical releases trend  -0.128**  -0.128** -0.128**
[0.021] [0.021] [0.021] 
Historical releases trend × Annual counter  0.012**  0.012** 0.012**
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
Log number of siblings (in 1994)  0.043**  0.043** 0.042**
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] 
Relative production level  0.184**  0.184** 0.184**
[0.070] [0.070] [0.070] 
Log employment  0.254**  0.253** 0.254**
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] 
Congressional district LCV score  0.017  0.017  0.015 
[0.048] [0.048] [0.048] 
Industry (2-digit SIC) dummies  Included  Included  Included 
Observations 138,888  138,888  138,888 
Number of establishments  23,918  23,918  23,918 
Wald test: Are coefficients on both interaction terms equal?        
     
2 statistic  8.45 2.51  10.98 
     p-value  [0.00] [0.11] [0.00] 
 
All models estimated with interval regression (left-censored). Brackets contain standard errors clustered by 
establishment; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. All samples include establishment-years during 1995–2000. The 
dependent variable is log (plus 1) of total releases reported to TRI of the 243 toxic chemicals that were added to the 
TRI chemical list in 1995. These total releases include those reported as production waste, transfers offsite, and 
releases to air, land, water, and underground injection. All models also include a dummy to indicate observations for 
which the value of relative production level was interpolated and observations for which historical releases trend, 
relative production level,  log employment, and Congressional district LCV score were missing. The dummy 
indicating missing observations for historical releases trend is interacted with the annual counter. 93/94 denotes a 
dummy variable whose value is based on establishment status in 1994 (or, if missing, in 1993), before the policy 
change that occurred in 1995. In the primary specification, proximity is based on city and industry equivalence is 
based on two-digit SIC code. 
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Table B3. First-differences OLS regression estimates 
Dependent variable: First-differenced log releases 














Proximate headquarters93/94  -0.040**        
[0.005]        
Proximate sibling93/94   -0.016+         
 [0.009]         
Proximate same-industry sibling93/94     -0.026**     
   [0.010]     
Proximate different-industry sibling93/94    0.015     
   [0.016]     
Large establishment93/94     0.013+  -0.035**   
    [0.008]  [0.008]   
Public ownership93/94         0.050** 
       [0.007] 
Relative production level (first difference)  0.170**  0.201**  0.202**  0.131**  0.159**  0.154** 
[0.031] [0.043] [0.043]  [0.047] [0.051] [0.036] 
Log employment (first difference)  0.018*  0.024*  0.024*  0.017  0.027  0.024* 
[0.008] [0.010] [0.010]  [0.013] [0.018] [0.011] 
Congressional district LCV score (first   -0.015  0.005  0.005  -0.009  -0.037  -0.021 
difference)  [0.021] [0.029] [0.029] [0.035]  [0.033]  [0.024] 
Constant  0.081** 0.079** 0.079**  0.064** 0.087** 0.053** 
[0.006] [0.007] [0.007]  [0.009] [0.009] [0.006] 
Observations 180,488  114,970  114,970  71,777  66,457  133,935 
Number of establishments  37,307  23,593 23,593 14,835  13,898  27,857 
Wald test: Are coefficients on both interaction 
terms equal? (F-statistic)           4.52*  11.08**   
 
All models estimated with OLS regression. Brackets contain standard errors clustered by establishment; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + 
p<0.10. All samples include establishment-years during 1995–2000. The dependent variable is the first difference of log (plus 1) of 
total releases reported to TRI of the 243 toxic chemicals that were added to the TRI chemical list in 1995. These total releases include 
those reported as production waste, transfers offsite, and releases to air, land, water, and underground injection. All models also 
include a dummy to indicate observations for which the value of relative production level was interpolated in the current and previous 
periods and observations for which historical releases trend, relative production level, log employment, and Congressional district 
LCV score were missing in the current and previous periods. 93/94 denotes a dummy variable whose value is based on establishment 
status in 1994 (or, if missing, in 1993), before the policy change that occurred in 1995. 
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Table B4. Interval regression estimates with time-varying moderators 
Dependent variable: Log releases 














Proximate headquarters × Annual counter  -0.051**           
[0.005]         
Proximate sibling × Annual counter    -0.019*         
  [0.009]       
Proximate same-industry sibling × Annual  counter      -0.035**     
    [0.009]     
Proximate different-industry sibling × Annual counter      0.022       
    [0.017]     
Large establishment × Annual counter        0.008  -0.010   
    [0.009]  [0.009]   
Public ownership × Annual counter            0.017* 
       [0.008] 
Proximate  headquarters  -0.039         
[0.025]         
Proximate  sibling   0.085+        
  [0.046]       
Proximate same-industry sibling      0.121*       
    [0.052]     
Proximate different-industry sibling      -0.041       
    [0.079]     
Large  establishment      -0.242**  -0.149*   
    [0.060]  [0.064]   
Public  ownership        0.053 
       [0.035] 
Annual counter  0.087**  0.091**  0.091**  0.068** 0.079** 0.066** 
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007]  [0.008]  [0.005] 
Historical releases trend  -0.110**  -0.128** -0.128** -0.097**  -0.089**  -0.096** 
[0.015] [0.021] [0.021] [0.023]  [0.023]  [0.016] 
Historical releases trend × Annual counter  0.008** 0.012** 0.012**  0.007+  0.005  0.006* 
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.003] 
Log number of siblings    0.042**  0.042**       
  [0.011]  [0.011]     
Relative production level  0.201** 0.183** 0.184** 0.130+  0.248**  0.203** 
[0.052] [0.070] [0.070] [0.078]  [0.081]  [0.057] 
Log employment  0.207**  0.254** 0.254** 0.299**  0.286**  0.238** 
[0.012] [0.016] [0.016] [0.025]  [0.027]  [0.013] 
Congressional district LCV score  0.053 0.017 0.017 0.088  -0.046  0.003 
[0.034] [0.048] [0.048] [0.054]  [0.052]  [0.037] 
Industry (2-digit SIC) dummies  Included  Included Included Included  Included  Included 
Observations 218,440  138,888  138,888 94,336  86,699  175,376 
Number  of  establishments  37,952 23,918 23,918 17,836  16,470  33,759 
Wald test: Are coefficients on both interaction terms equal? 
(
2 statistic)          8.17**  2.04   
 
Notes: All models estimated with interval regression (left-censored). Brackets contain standard errors clustered by establishment; ** 
p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. All samples include establishment-years during 1995–2000. The dependent variable is log (plus 1) of 
total releases reported to TRI of the 243 toxic chemicals that were added to the TRI chemical list in 1995. These total releases include 
those reported as production waste, transfers offsite, and emissions to air, land, water, and underground injection. All models also 
include a dummy to indicate observations for which the value of relative production level was interpolated and observations for which 
historical releases trend, relative production level, log employment, and Congressional district LCV score were missing. The dummy 
indicating missing observations for historical releases trend is interacted with the annual counter. 93/94
 denotes a dummy variable 
whose value is based on establishment status in 1994 (or, if missing, in 1993), before the policy change that occurred in 1995 Appendix p. 13 
 
Table B5. Robustness tests of Hypothesis 4: Alternative definitions of large establishment and regional sparseness 
Dependent variable: Log releases 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 






















Sparse vs. dense region based on:   Number of TRI 
establishments in the focal 
establishment’s county 
compared to the sample 
median county 
Employment of all TRI 
establishments in the focal 
establishment’s city 
compared to the sample 
median city 
Number of TRI establishments in the focal establishment’s city compared 
to the sample mean city 
Large establishment based on:   Establishment’s employment 
exceeds its state median 
Establishment’s 
employment exceeds its 
state median 
Establishment’s 
employment within top 
quartile of its state 
Establishment’s 
employment exceeds its 
state average 
n/a 
Large establishment93/94 × Annual counter  0.039**  -0.006  0.029**  0.000  0.059**  0.008  0.059**  0.016     
[0.008]  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]     
Establishment size93/94 × Annual counter                  0.026**  0.004 
             [0.006]  [0.004] 
Large establishment93/94  -0.211**  -0.056 -0.011  -0.211** 0.038 0.250**  0.004 0.201**     
[0.063]  [0.061]  [0.057]  [0.065]  [0.065] [0.072] [0.065] [0.072]     
Establishment size93/94               0.230**  0.228** 
             [0.045]  [0.045] 
Annual  counter  0.045**  0.060**  0.042**  0.068**  0.046** 0.059** 0.045** 0.057** 0.062** 0.061** 
[0.007]  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Historical releases trend  -0.090**  -0.085**  -0.090**  -0.087**  -0.099** -0.073** -0.100** -0.073** -0.088** -0.066** 
[0.025]  [0.021]  [0.023]  [0.023]  [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] 
Historical releases trend × Annual counter  0.011**  0.006  0.010*  0.007+  0.010* 0.009* 0.010* 0.009* 0.010**  0.010* 
[0.004]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
Relative  production  level  0.065  0.244** 0.170*  0.167*  0.151+ 0.183* 0.149+ 0.181* 0.167* 0.194* 
[0.082]  [0.081]  [0.082]  [0.081]  [0.082] [0.081] [0.082] [0.081] [0.081] [0.081] 
Log  employment  0.311**  0.242**  0.184**  0.340**  0.222** 0.197** 0.229** 0.203** 0.139** 0.150** 
[0.026]  [0.025]  [0.023]  [0.026]  [0.020] [0.023] [0.021] [0.023] [0.020] [0.023] 
Congressional district LCV score  0.098  0.026  -0.006  0.042  0.083  -0.027  0.088  -0.025  0.059  -0.045 
[0.065]  [0.052]  [0.054]  [0.056]  [0.057] [0.054] [0.057] [0.054] [0.056] [0.054] 
Industry (2-digit SIC) dummies  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations  83,490  84,102  82,078  85,514  86,925 80,667 86,925 80,667 86,925 80,667 
Number  of  establishments  14,470  14,888  14,322  15,036  15,148 14,210 15,148 14,210 15,148 14,210 
Wald test: Are coefficients on both interaction terms equal?                     
     
2 statistic  15.96** 6.88*  13.22**  9.46**  8.45** 
All models estimated with interval regression (left-censored). Brackets contain standard errors clustered by establishment; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. All samples include establishment-years 
during 1995–2000. The dependent variable is log (plus 1) of total releases reported to TRI of the 243 toxic chemicals that were added to the TRI chemical list in 1995. These total releases include 
those reported as production waste, transfers offsite, and releases to air, land, water, and underground injection. All models also include a dummy to indicate observations for which the value of 
relative production level was interpolated and observations for which historical releases trend, relative production level, log employment, and Congressional district LCV score were missing. The 
dummy indicating missing observations for historical releases trend is interacted with the annual counter. 93/94 denotes a dummy variable whose value is based on establishment status in 1994 (or, if 
missing, in 1993), before the policy change that occurred in 1995. Sparse counties includes establishments in counties with no more than the county median of 39 establishments; dense counties 
includes establishments in counties with greater than the county median of 39 establishments. Sparse cities includes establishments in cities with no more than the city median of 10.5 establishments; 
dense cities includes establishments in cities with greater than the city median of 10.5 establishments. Low-employment cities includes establishments in cities with no more than the city median TRI 
employment of 1,500; high-employment cities includes establishments in cities with greater than the city median TRI employment of 1,500. Appendix p. 14 
 
Table B6. Additional robustness test of Hypothesis 4: Continuous measures of large establishment and 
regional sparseness 






Establishment size93/94 × Log establishments in city93/94 × Annual counter  -0.010** 
[0.003] 
Establishment size93/94 × Log establishments in city93/94 -0.011 
[0.019] 
Establishment size93/94 × Annual counter  0.042** 
[0.009] 
Establishment size93/94 0.262** 
[0.061] 
Log establishments in city93/94 × Annual counter  0.000 
[0.002] 
Log establishments in city93/94 -0.032** 
[0.010] 
Annual counter  0.061** 
[0.006] 
Historical releases trend  -0.081** 
[0.016] 
Historical releases trend × Annual counter  0.010** 
[0.003] 
Relative production level  0.187** 
[0.057] 
Log employment  0.138** 
[0.015] 
Congressional district LCV score  0.014 
[0.039] 
Industry (2-digit SIC) dummies  Included 
Observations 167,592 
Number of establishments  29,358 
 
All models estimated with interval regression (left-censored). Brackets contain standard errors clustered by 
establishment; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. All samples include establishment-years during 1995–2000. The 
dependent variable is log (plus 1) of total releases reported to TRI of the 243 toxic chemicals that were added to the 
TRI chemical list in 1995. These total releases include those reported as production waste, transfers offsite, and 
releases to air, land, water, and underground injection. All models also include a dummy to indicate observations for 
which the value of relative production level was interpolated and observations for which historical releases trend, 
relative production level,  log employment, and Congressional district LCV score were missing. The dummy 
indicating missing observations for historical releases trend is interacted with the annual counter. 93/94 denotes a 
dummy variable whose value is based on establishment status in 1994 (or, if missing, in 1993), before the policy 
change that occurred in 1995. 
 
 
 
 
 